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THE WORLD-SOUL IN THE PLATONIC COSMOLOGY
RICHARD MOHR
In each of Plato's major cosmological works, the Timaeus , the
Statesman myth and the Philebus , he asserts that the body of
the whole universe is alive and possesses a single World-
Soul which extends throughout it. I wish to offer a new in-
terpretation of the role of the World-Soul which gives the
World-Soul a special function in the economy of the Platonic
cosmology and which explains why Plato would place such re-
peated emphasis on the existence of such an odd-sounding
creature. I suggest that Plato is not viewing the World-Soul
on the model of the Phaedrus and Laws X, which view soul as a
self-and-other moving motion. Nor, I suggest, is Plato view-
ing the World-Soul on the model of soul taken as a crafting
agent that initiates order. Rather I suggest that Plato views
the World-Soul merely as a maintainer of order against a nat-
ural tendency of the corporeal to be chaotic.
It is important to notice that in each of these three cos-
mological dialogues Plato claims that the ordered World-Soul
and the order of the World-Body are severally and in their
synchronizations the products of the workings of a single,
eternal, divine, rational Demiurge, which resides outside the
universe. Further, in all three of these dialogues the phe-
nomena are viewed as necessarily in flux. The erratic flux
of the phenomena wholly characterizes the pre-cosmic and acos-
mic periods of the Timaeus and Statesman myth -- but, in addition,
it remains a potent and considerable factor even within the
ordered and ensouled cosmos ( Timaeus 43a-b, Statesman 273c-d
and add Philebus A3a, 59a-b and Cratylus 439d, which do not dis-
2)tinguish between cosmic and acosmic periods)
.
With these observations in tow, I suggest that the World-
Soul operates in the Platonic cosmology rather like a governor
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on a steam engine: the governor regulates the motions of the
machine in such a way that the machine's self-sustained and in-
dependently originated motions, which owing to unpredictable
conditions of combustion tend to run off to excess, are none-
theless uniformly maintained and do not destroy the machine it-
self. However, the governor neither initiates the motions it
regulates nor is it itself the cause of its being synchronized
with the machine. This synchronization, which enables the gov-
ernor to govern, is derived from some external source. And
like a machine-governor, the World-Soul is capable of maintain-
ing order only within a certain range of natural disruptions
( Statesman 273d-e) .
If, as is the case, Plato believes material objects to be
necessarily in a chaotic flux even in the formed and ensouled
cosmos (Timaeus 43a-b, Statesman 273c-d) , then it is natural that
he should view one of the major functions of soul to be the
maintenance of order against the natural tendency of the cor-
poreal to be chaotic, thus saving the appearance of the contin-
uous order which we indeed do observe in the phenomenal realm.
For Plato the homeostatic conditions of the observed world can-
not be explained by physical theories; rather, they have to be
explained in spite of physical theories (of the sort articulated
at Timaeus 58a-c) .
WORLD-SOUL IN THE STATESMAN. In the Statesman myth the Demiurge is said
to make the World-Soul, to make it rational (269dl) and to form the ordered
World-Body {269d7-9, 273b6-7, 273e3). In the structure of the dialogue as
a whole the Demiurge is functionally contrasted with the World-Soul as a
shepherd is contrasted with a human statesman (275a-276b). The Demiurge is
like a shepherd in that he constructs on his own every material component
of the objects of his craft, whereas the World-Soul is like a human states-
man just to the extent that all the necessary material preparations and
organizations of the object of its activities are handed over to it from
other sources than itself. Since this is held to be the case at the level
of discourse of the divisions that make up the bulk of the dialogue, it is
difficult to claim that the division of the Demiurge from the World-Soul is
merely a literary exigency of the myth (as some people would claim is the
case in the Tvmaeus) . ' In the case of the World-Soul, it is the whole or-
der of the world that is handed over to it (273a7-b2). This is dramatically
represented by the withdrawal of the Demiurge from the world, which he
Richard Mohr 43
leaves in the care and control of the World-Soul. The World-Soul, though,
unlike the human statesman, does not further organize the organization al-
ready handed over to it (305e ff.). Rather the World-Soul tries to main-
tain the orderly homeostatic conditions of the World-Body, as it is inher-
ited from the Demiurge, against the necessary, erratic, even explosive
( cf. e^avOe L, 273dl) , incursions of the bodily, which tend to throw the
organization of the World-Body and World-Soul out of kilter (273b,d). The
World-Soul performs this task not by initiating order, but merely by try-
ing to remember and preserve the orderings given from the Demiurge ( 273bl-2,
c6). Eventually though, the bodily incursions succeed in disrupting the
World-Soul's memory and the World-Soul thereupon loses its ability to main-
tain order. This decay necessitates the reappearance of the Demiurge to
restore order both to the World-Soul and World-Body {273d-e). It seems
then that the World-Soul is not being viewed as an initiator of orderly
motion either in itself or in the World-Body. For this role is reserved
for the Demiurge. Neither is the World-Soul viewed as the source of the
4)disorderly motions which are said to erupt into it.
If in addition to regulating motions, the World-Soul were able to ini-
tiate new motion it is not clear why it must succumb to the disruptions of
the corporeal. If it were able to induce new motion, it would be able not
merely to keep a lid on disruptive forces but to counteract and diffuse the
cause of disruption. Further, if it had self-initiated thought and reason,
items in the catalogue of self-motions in Laws X (897a-b), and did not have
its rationality derived entirely from an external source, then it is not
clear why, on its own, its failures of memory are irreparable and irrevers-
ible, such that it is necessary for the Demiurge to reappear to initiate
new order.
It is, then, I suggest, to the homeostatic condition of living crea-
tures, rather than to their ability to self-initiate locomotion and to move
other objects, to which Plato in the Statesman myth is primarily appealing
when he posits the world as a living creature ( £cpov , 269dl). This sort
of appeal should be contrasted with the doctrine of the autokinetic soul in
the Phaedrus and Laws X. In each of these texts it is not to homeostatic
conditions of living organisms, but rather to the motor powers of living
bodies to which Plato appeals in order to identify that which is autokinetic
with soul. It is because living bodies move themselves and other things
that we know that that which is autokinetic is soul (Phaedvus 245e, Laws
895c). ^^
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WORLD-SOUL IN THE PHILEBUS. The function of the World-Soul as a main-
tainer of homeostatic conditions, a function which results from its vivify-
ing effects on bodies, is also evident in the Philebus (30a), a dialogue
in which, as in the Statesman and Timeaus, flux characterizes the phenomena
(43a, 59a-b) and in which there is not the slightest trace of the autoki-
netic doctrine. As in the Statesman and Timaeus^ the order of the world's
body is derived from the transcendent rational Demiurge (28d). In addi-
tion, also as in the other two dialogues, the Demiurge is the cause of the
presence of the World-Soul and its rationality in the ordered World-Body
(30c-d). And so again there is no suggestion that the World-Soul is the
efficient cause of the motion or the order of the World-Body.
Rather, the World-Soul here is viewed as standing to the order of the
universe, as represented in the orderly years, seasons and months, as our
souls stand to our bodily order, as represented by health (30b-c). The
only actions of our soul-body complex here mentioned as being relevantly
paralleled in the World-Soul = World-Body complex are physical exercise and
(self-) doctoring; both of which maintain or restore from deviation the
homeostatic condition of the body. Notice that nutritional and sheltering
arts are significantly not on the list of parallel practices, since we may
assume they both involve manipulations of the external world while the only
actions relevant to the World-Soul are internally directed. (For exercise
and proper doctoring dealing only with the relation of the body with itself
and not with the external world, see Timaeus 89a-b.) Our souls are the
cause of the maintenance of health or proper orderings of our bodies against
a natural propensity towards disease, which is viewed as a sort of internal
corrosion (cf. Timaeus 82a-83a). Analogously, the only actions entertained
as being performed by the World-Soul are the regulations of the World-Body
which maintain its order against disruption natural to it. Indeed it is
to save the appearance of rational order that it is claimed that there must
be a World-Soul (30c-d). Plato does call the World-Soul a cause (30al0),
but it is only in the sense of maintainer that Plato is so committed.
WORLD-SOUL IN THE TIMAEUS. In the Timaeus we are told little of the
nature of the functional relations between the World-Body and the World-
Soul. All that we are told is that the World-Soul is the mistress and gov-
ernor ( 6eaTi<5TLV Hal dpgouaav , 34c5) of the world-Body. What form
this governance is to take, we are not told. I suggest, though, that it
entails no more than the sort of governance I have already mentioned, name-
ly, the maintenance of order. There is no suggestion in the Timaeus that
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the World-Soul is either autokinetic or is the efficient cause of either
the order or the motion of the World-Body. The form and orderly motion of
both the World-Soul and World-Body are derived from the Demiurge (31b-36e).
In commenting on 36d-e Cornford writes: "The above sentences reiterate
the emphasis already laid at 34b on the fact that the soul extends through-
out the body of the world from centre to circumference, and communicates
its motion to the whole" (p. 93). Now it is true that the World-Soul is so
extended, but there is not a word in the text about the World-Soul commu-
nicating its motion to the World-Body. Rather we have in the text a highly
detailed account of parallel structures and synchronized motions (as rep-
resented in celestial dynamics) between the World-Soul and World-Body.
This synchronization is derived from the Demiurge and is not of the World-
Soul's making. Note that Plato is free to have said otherwise. For, when
at 34c Plato admits that his narrative order was mistaken and misleading
in having spoken of the World-Body being composed prior to the World-Soul,
he could have taken the opportunity to claim that it was merely an exigency
of his narrative order that forced him to claim that the Demiurge rather
than the World-Soul composed the order of the World-Body and initiated its
orderly motions, since in the mistaken narrative order the World-Soul did
not even exist when the World-Body was established. But later, the mistake
in narrative order having been pointed out, the cosmological claims of 34b
are allowed to stand and are reiterated: the structure and motion of the
World-Soul and World-Body severally and the synchronizations between them
are all workings of the Demiurge (36d-e). Taken at face value, the Timaeus
strongly suggests that when Plato claims governance on behalf of the World-
Soul, he does not mean that the World-Soul acts as a crafting agent or as
an efficient cause of motion.
*
At first inspection the World-Soul strikes us as perhaps
the oddest of many odd components of Platonic cosmology in that
it is highly counter-intuitive: the world just does not feel
like an animal. Most of it is clearly inert and the parts of
it which are animate do not seem to form a single composite
whole which is one animal. Further, the World-Soul appears to
be redundant or useless ontological baggage on most interpreta-
tions, which assimilate it either to the autokinetic doctrine
or to the view of souls as a crafting agent. For if the World-
Soul is merely one more autokinetic soul, it has no special
function in the economy of Plato's cosmology. And similarly if
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the World-Soul is viewed (incorrectly in my opinion) as mainly
an agent that crafts external objects, then it becomes indis-
tinguishable in function from the Demiurge. If it is under-
stood, though, that Plato viewed order among the phenomena as
the thinnest of veneers, made out of and spread over that which
is inherently rotting, we then see that it is reasonable for
Plato • 1) To assume the existence of a regulating agency which
on the one hand is necessarily non-material but on the other
hand is immanent in the corporeal world, thus explaining the
persistence of what sensible order there is in the world and
2) to leave the original source of the order of both the World-
Body and World-Soul outside the soul-body complex, thus un-
affected by the natural corrupting influence of the corporeal.
If my interpretation of the World-Soul is correct, two ad-
ditional oddities of its characterization are explained. Typ-
ically one of the functions of an ensouled rational creature
is deliberation and practical reason. Second, typically for
Plato souls are viewed as capable of discarnate existence. Yet
neither of these characterizations holds of the World-Soul in
either the Timaeus^ Statesman, or Philebus: 1) Though in the Timaeus
the World-Soul has true opinion and contemplative reason (37
b-c , esp. cl,2) , we never hear here or in the Philehus or States-
man of the World-Soul deliberating or making decisions, as do
the Demiurge and statesmen [Statesman 3 Sb ff.; Republic 483c-d,
500e) . The World-Soul's rationality is not that of planning
or producing with the aid of paradigms, as is in large part
the rationality of the Demiurge and statesman. But, if as I
have suggested the World-Soul's function is that of mainten-
ance of order rather than initiating order, this is to be ex-
pected. 2) Unlike personal souls, the World-Soul is never view-
ed as existing in a discarnate condition. If its function is
the maintenance of homeostatic conditions of material objects,
it can only do this by being present in them. Insofar as the
ordered world is to exist sempiternally ( Timaeus 38b-c) , so too
must the World-Soul abide in it.
Aristotle thought that through the whole of the natural world
the motions of bodies on their own were constant, uniform, and
orderly enough that it made sense to describe both animate and
inanimate objects as moving homeostatically , as though the
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whole of nature were like someone who heals himself {Physios
II, 8, 199b30-32) . Plato felt that the corporeal itself was
so chaotic that at best ensouled objects could maintain orderly
homeostatic conditions, and even then with only limited success.
Further, though the World-Soul for Plato, in order to have its
special function as a maintainer of order, is necessarily im-
manent in the corporeal, it is not immanent in the corporeal as
the result of its ontological status or make up, which is the
same as that of human souls, which are capable of discarnate
existence (Timaeus 41d-e) . In prinaiple , then, the World-Soul
should be capable of discarnate existence. So that though in
fact the World-Soul is immanent in the material world, it is not
to be confused as being merely the functioning or actualization
of a body of a certain type, as is the soul for Aristotle, which
as such is not capable, even in principle, of discarnate exist-
ence {De Anima II, 1, esp. 413a4) . There are additional reasons
to suppose the World-Soul is not the actualization of a body of
a certain type. One, it is a pre-condition for any matter even
being the sort of thing which might be ordered enough to be con-
sidered an organ with a function. Two, the World-Soul is not
the functioning of a body, but is that which makes it possible
that the functions of various bodily parts are sustained. And
three, unlike Aristotelian souls, the World-Soul has no limit
on what sorts of body it may vivify. There is no proper matter
for the World-Soul: it is present in both flesh and brass. The
World-Soul, unlike Aristotelian souls, is self-substantial in-
dependently of its material inherence. The immanent World-
Soul is not a step in the direction of either La?js X or De Anima II.
University of Illinois at Urbana
NOTES
1) Statesman 269c-270a, 272e-273e; Philehus 28d, 30a-d; Timaeus 31b-36e.
I take these texts to be doctrinally homogeneous with each other.
The account of how the Demiurge makes the World-Soul [Timaeus 35a) is,
I think, largely inscrutable. For a reasonable attempt at an interpreta-
tion, though, see T. M. Robinson, Plato's Psychology (Toronto, 1970), pp.
70-74.
2) Though I think it more likely than not that Plato means what he
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says, when he says there was a chaotic pre-cosmic era, nothing in this
paper hangs on whether Plato believed in an initial act of demiurgic world
formation. Further, though I believe that the flux of phenomena is purely
mechanical in origin, so that the Timaeus , Statesman, and Philebus are in-
consistent with the claim of the Phaedrus (245c9) and Laws X (896bl) that
soul is the source and cause of all motion, again, nothing I wish to claim
in this paper hangs on this issue.
3) The overwhelming tendency in Platonic scholarship has been to read
the claims about the Demiurge non-literally . The Demiurge has been taken
as a doublet for the whole World-Soul (Archer-Hind) , or for the rational
part of it (Cornford) , as a general symbol for any craftsman-like activity
(Cherniss) , as only a hypothetical entity serving as a literary foil to the
human statesman and World-Soul (Herter) and recently as a "sublation" of
the World-Soul (Stanley Rosen, "The Myth of the Reversed Cosmos," Review
of Metaphysics, 33, 1 [1979], 75-76).
4) Robinson suggests that the corporeal is merely like a virus which
in itself is passive and inert and is active and disruptive only when it
comes in contact with a living organism (pp. 136-7) . This view though does
little justice to the descriptions at 273a-b of the corporeal on its own as
active and even explosive in its incursions into the World-Soul.
The majority of translators and critics take the World-Soul to be the
efficient cause of the reverse rotation of the universe (Skemp, Herter)
.
This is the result of mistakenly reading the 6v of 269dl causally rather
than descriptively, and thus as asserting the World-Soul as the cause of
the reverse circuit. This cannot be the case, though, for the cause of
the reverse circuit is left an open question to be answered only after
269d3 {6LiL T(55' , 269d2) and when this cause is forthcoming (whatever it
is) , it exists in spite of, not because of, the presence of the World-Soul
(269d7-9)
.
5) Robinson (mistakenly, I think) takes several reflexive phrases in
the myth as referring to autokinetic soul (pp. 134, 135, 139)
:
i) auxi tauxd oxpdcpet dei, 269e5 (of the Demiurge). But oxpi-
cpELV cannot merely be a synecdoche for HLVELV, for so construed it does
not fulfill the demands of the context. It is because the Demiurge moves
constantly in one direction rather than because it is autokinetic that it
is said that the Demiurge cannot cause two contrary motions. That the
phrase is reflexive merely means that the Demiurge's rotation is independ-
ent and non-contingent, in contrast to the rotations of the world.
ii) xfjc auToO KLvrioecoC/ 269e4. The antecedent of auxou, though,
is the World-Body (269d7-8) ,not the World-Soul, which it comes to possess
(d8-9, with dl) . The phrase merely describes the motion of the World-Body
(or World-Body=World-Soul complex) as it is moved in the train of the Dem-
iurge's rotation. The term auxoO means something like "proper to itself
under the best of conditions."
iii) Finally, Si * feauxou after Burnet, 270a5. This expression is to
be taken mechanistically (as Robinson admits it might be) , for the immedi-
ately ensuing account of the world's reverse motion is described entirely
on a mechanistic model (270a6-8) , even if one wishes to claim Plato means
something else. But in the latter case the phrase ceases to be direct
evidence for autokinesis. But in any case I think 5l * eaux6v of the BT
mss should be preserved, meaning "throughout itself".
6) On Timaeus 37b5, which is sometimes seen as such a suggestion, see
Cornford 's note ad loG. , which has not been superseded by later discussions
{Plato's Cosmology [London, 1937]).
